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Abstract 
Many studies in the psychological literature focus on the 
distinctive features of physical and psychological causality 
understanding. Our aim is a preliminary study from a 
different perspective, looking for similarities in the two 
domains.  The results of Experiment 1 (38 adults 
participants) confirm our prediction: some features of the 
perceptual stimulus affect causality understanding in both 
the physical and the psychological domain. Also, the results 
of Experiment 2 (16 autistic children and 16 controls) 
confirm a clinical prediction deriving from our assumption. 
Autistic individuals, who  are notoriously impaired in 
understanding psychological causality, turn out to be 
impaired also in understanding physical causality.  
Keywords: Causality understanding; physical causality; 
psychological causality. 
Introduction 
The notion of causality is central in both the physical and 
the psychological domains. In the physical realm, the 
rotation movement of the Earth causes the alternation of 
night and day, while in the psychological domain the 
defying glance of a child causes her friend’s wild reaction.  
In the physical domain, particular attention was devoted to 
simple launching events such as a billiard ball colliding with 
and launching another billiard ball – i.e., the same kind of 
events notoriously studied by the philosopher Hume 
(1741/1978). Two centuries later, Piaget (1955) studied how 
children develop causality understanding. An important 
finding in the most recent literature is that individuals are 
sensitive to the contingency or temporal contiguity between 
pairings of a cause and an effect. In other words, cause and 
effect must be temporally contiguous in order to generate a 
judgement of causality. A 0.5 seconds delay between an   
action and  its outcome suffices to decrease causality 
perception in young infants (see, e.g., Spelke, Phillips & 
Woodward, 1995). In adults, Michotte (1963) observed that 
the perceptual system assumes cause-effect relations in the 
absence of contradictory evidence such as the lack of 
temporal or spatial contiguity, even when there is no real 
object.  
In the psychological domain, many studies attempted to 
understand which perceptual features trigger the perception 
of agents. Baron-Cohen (1995), for example, purported the 
existence of the Mindreading System, a cognitive 
mechanism detecting complex psychological causes of 
action. One component of the system is the Intentionality 
Detector (ID), a specialized perceptual mechanism detecting 
an agent’s goal. Other studies evidenced that eyes are 
fundamental social and psychological stimuli. It is from the 
presence of eyes that we immediately recognize agents, and 
we spontaneously tend to “read” mental states in the eyes of 
someone. According to Baron-Cohen (1995), eye-like 
stimuli trigger the Eye Direction Detector (EDD) 
component of the Mindreading System, that computes the 
direction of the gaze, finding what the eyes are looking at. 
ID and EDD trigger SAM (Shared Attention Mechanism), 
which detects mutual attention and communicative 
situations. The assumption of specialized mechanisms 
involved in psychological causality is enforced by clinical 
data that can be read in terms of an impairment in such a 
mechanism. In particular, causal psychological 
understanding is notoriously impaired in autism (see, e.g., 
Klin, 2000, Klin, Volkmar & Sparrow, 1992). Autistic 
people generally do not understand the psychological state 
expressed by a particular glance, nor they understand that a 
person wants what she is looking at (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001). At a higher level, they do not understand that beliefs 
cause behavior. On the contrary, autism is not regarded as a 
syndrome that impairs physical causality understanding 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1986).  
Some studies revealed a precocious ability to differentiate 
agents from objects in causal events. For example, 
Woodward and colleagues (1993) found evidence that 7-
month-old infants make a distinction between mechanical 
forces and animate sources of motion. On the whole, those 
experimental data show that people not only have 
precocious causal understanding in both the physical and 
psychological domains, but also   know that the two realms 
are governed by different principles. An interesting question 
thus concerns the relation of the two domains of knowledge. 
Some authors tend to see causal understanding in the 
physical and   psychological domains as completely 
separated. According to Leslie (1994), for example, the 
cognitive mechanism ToBy (Theory of Body Mechanism) 
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allows us to understand the physical notion of force, while 
ToMM1 (Theory of Mind Mechanism 1) and ToMM2 
(Theory of Mind Mechanism 2) are the bases of   
psychological understanding. Also, the Mindreading System 
proposed by Baron-Cohen (1995) is triggered by 
specifically agentive stimuli, such as eyes and  self-
propelled movement. Gelman, Durgin and Kaufman (1995) 
purport a different view. They claim that there exist 
numerous skeletal causal principles that organize attention 
to and learning about the animate-inanimate distinction. 
Perceiving a particular kind of movement is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to identify causal situations: other 
conceptual information, such as those concerning the 
transmission of force and the respect of specific naïve 
physical principles,  are also considered (see also Leslie & 
Keeble, 1987; Spelke, 1994). 
 
Cognitive Principles of Causality 
Understanding 
In line with Gelman and colleagues (1995), we assume that 
numerous factors contribute to causality understanding. 
From this perspective our study looks for possible factors 
playing a major role in both the physical and the 
psychological domains. We considered interactive situations 
more complex than those situations typically investigated in 
the literature;  we explored both judgments of physical and 
psychological causality and, within the two categories, two 
further sub-categories. As regards physical events, we 
allowed for the possibility to judge it as an instance of either 
a chance event or an event of physical causality. As regards 
psychological events, we allowed for the possibility to 
evaluate them as instances of private psychological 
causality or communicative psychological causality. With 
private psychological causality we refer to a situation where 
the agents act on their own, with no communicative intent.   
With communicative psychological causality we refer to a 
situation where at least one agent acts with the intention to 
communicate something to others (Grice, 1989). 
A main assumption of our investigation was that 
psychological causality judgements may be affected by the 
same features of the perceptual stimulus as physical 
causality judgements are. In particular, as contact and 
temporal contiguity, compared with no contact and no 
temporal contiguity, distinguishes between a physical 
causality event and a chance event,  we expected them to 
distinguish between two different kinds of psychological 
causality judgment, i.e., communicative and private. From 
our assumption another important prediction follows. If 
some cognitive principles are central to both the physical 
and the psychological domains, then autistic people should 
also have difficulties in physical causality understanding.  
 
 
Experiment 1: Evidence for Aspects Common 
to Physical and Psychological Causality 
judgments 
The adults participants in the experiment were invited to 
watch some video-taped animations and to answer, for each 
animation, two questions (translated from Italian): 1) “Are 
those moving on the screen characters or objects?”, 2) “Do 
they move independently or they interact?”. We combined 
the answers to the two questions and we coded them as 
follows: 
• Objects that move independently: chance event.  
• Objects that move dependently: physical causality. 
• Characters moving independently: private 
psychological causality. 
• Characters moving dependently: communicative 
psychological causality.  
 
Method  
Thirty-six students at Turin University participated in the 
experiment (7 males and 29 females: mean age 23 years). 
They were students attending a course of General 
Psychology and voluntarily accepted to take part in the 
experiment. The experimental material consisted of 12 
video-animations all sharing the same structure. Each 
animation involved two billiard balls of the same size 
(diameter: 110 pixels) and started with a ball standing at ¾ 
of the visible area (on the right side of the screen); let us call 
it the first ball. After 1 second another ball, let us call it the 
second ball, which was not visible at the beginning of the 
animation, arrived from the left side of the screen (speed: 
18.1 cm/sec in a 14-inch television set). Only at this point 
the first ball moved through the right side of the screen and 
exited. Each animation ended with the ball that entered the 
screen resting in the place where originally stopped. The 
twelve video-animations differed according to the following 
variables: presence of eyes or not; ocular contact or not; 
physical contact or not; temporal contiguity of 0.5 seconds 
or not. In the “no contact” condition, the second ball 
stopped before arriving at the central part of the screen. 
Figure 1 illustrates a photogram of an animation (i.e., an 
instance of animation involving eyes, eye contact, physical 
contact). 
 
 
Figure 1. A photogram of an animation characterized by the 
presence of eyes, eye contact and physical contact. 
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The 12 animations were arranged in four different random 
orders and the participants were casually assigned to one of 
the four randomizations, for a total of 9 participants in each 
randomization. The experiment was carried out individually, 
in a quiet room. Participants were told that the experiment 
was concerned with how individuals judge brief animations. 
Each animation was presented twice; once after the first 
question, once after the second question. 
 
Results and Discussion    
For a conservative analysis, which allows us to consider 
how globally the variables we considered affected 
individuals’ judgments,  we carried out a series of log-linear 
analyses.  If we consider all the variables with the exception 
of eye contact (the animations without eyes do not feature 
this variable), the STEPWISE log-linear analysis selects as 
the best model (LR χ2 (df=12): 7.84, p=.80) the model in 
which judgments were affected by the variable eyes (see 
Table 1) and by the interaction between physical contact and 
temporal contiguity (Table 2).  
 
Table 1. Contingency table eyes*judgment. 
 
Judgment 
  
 Eyes 
Chance 
   Physic. 
Causality 
Priv. 
Psych. 
Com. 
Psych. 
Total 
- 67 67 9 1 144 
+ 30 25 111 122 288 
Total 97 92 120 123 432 
 
From Table 1 we can consider that animations without the 
eyes lead participants to judge the event as pertaining to the 
physical domain, whereas the presence of the eyes led to 
judge the event as an instance of causality in the 
psychological domain.  
 
Table 2.  Contingency table physical 
contact*judgment*temporal contiguity. 
 
Judgment Temporal 
contiguity 
  Chance 
   Physic. 
Causality 
Priv. 
Psych. 
Com. 
Psych.  Total 
+ Physical 
contact 
- 
+ 
32 
1 
13 
51 
35 
7 
28 
49 
108 
108 
 Total  33 64 42 77 216 
- Physical 
contact 
- 
+ 
38 
26 
6 
22 
47 
31 
17 
29 
108 
108 
 Total  64 28 78 46 216 
 
Table 2 shows that, independently on the presence of the 
eyes, when there was temporal contiguity, and there was 
physical contact, participants judged the event as either 
physical causality or communicative psychological 
causality. When there was no temporal contiguity, and there 
was not physical contact, participants judged the events as 
either a chance event or private psychological causality.  
Let us consider only the animations with eyes (for them 
we can consider the variable eye contact); the STEPWISE 
log-linear analysis selects as the best model the model in 
which judgments were affected by the interrelation between 
physical contact and temporal contiguity (LR χ2 (df=16): 
15.02, p=.52); see Table 3). In case of temporal contiguity 
and physical contact, participants tended to judge the event 
as either physical causality or psychological causality. In 
case of no temporal contiguity and no physical contact, 
participants tended to judge the event as private 
psychological in the psychological realm.  
 
Table 3. Contingency table physical 
contact*judgment*temporal contiguity. 
 
 
We conclude that some features of the perceptual stimulus 
affected individuals’ judgments of causality both in the 
physical and the psychological domains. In particular, our 
global results reveal that physical contact and temporal 
contiguity were essential to distinguish between a chance 
event and physical causality in the realm of objects 
(animations without eyes), and between private 
psychological causality and communicative psychological 
causality in the realm of agents (animations with eyes).  
 
Experiment 2: Clinical Evidence  
Experiment 2 was devised to test a clinical prediction. 
Autistic children, who are impaired in psychological 
causality understanding, ought to be impaired also in 
physical causality understanding. The experimental 
procedure of this study (see below) allowed us to overcome 
a limit of Experiment 1, which did not discriminate between 
communicative psychological causality and physical 
causality involving agents in animations with eyes. An 
agent could cause the movement of another agent 
unintentionally.  
 
Method  
The experimental group consisted of sixteen children (12 
males and 4 females: mean age: 8;9) with a diagnosis 
pertaining to the autistic spectrum according to the DSM-IV 
Judgment 
Temporal  
contiguity 
 Chance 
   Physic. 
Causality 
Priv.  
Psych. 
Com. 
Psych. 
Total 
+ Physical 
contact 
- 
+ 
10 
 0 
2 
17 
32 
6 
28 
49 
 72 
 72 
Total 10 19 38 77 144 
- Physical 
contact 
- 
+ 
10 
10 
1 
5 
44 
29 
17 
28 
 72 
 72 
 Total 20 6 73 45 144 
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and the ICD-10. In particular, 8 children were autistic, 4 had 
a pervasive disease of the development non otherwise 
specified, and 4 had Asperger syndrome. Their non verbal 
mental age - as measured by the Brief IQ (BIQ) Screening 
Assessment from the Leiter International Performance Scale 
Revised (Roid & Miller, 1997) - was 6;9 years, and their 
verbal mental age - as measured by the Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary Test Revised (Dunn & Dunn, 1981) - was 6;7 
years. Children were all attending the Center for autism of 
the Local Sanitary Health Authority of Cuneo.  
The control group consisted of sixteen non-autistic 
children attending the local schools of Cuneo. They were 
comparable to the autistic children for sex and verbal mental 
age (12 males and 4 females: mean verbal mental age: 6;7 
years). We assumed also a match of the two groups of 
participants on non verbal mental age.  
Children were presented with a theory of mind test and 
with the causality test we devised. The theory of mind test 
was intended to ascertain that our autistic children were 
impaired in theory of mind tasks like the autistic children 
described in the literature. We used the classical Sally and 
Ann test (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), presented 
through a series of 5 vignettes. There were two doll 
protagonists, Sally and Anne. Sally first placed a marble 
into her basket. Then she left the scene, and the marble was 
transferred by Anne and hidden in her box. Then, when 
Sally returned, the experimenter asked the critical Belief 
Question: “Where will Sally look for her marble?”. If the 
children point to the previous location of the marble, then 
they pass the Belief Question by appreciating the doll’s now 
false belief. If however, they point to the marble’s current 
location, then they fail the question by not taking into 
account the doll’s belief. These conclusions are warranted if 
two control questions are answered correctly: “Where is the 
marble really?” (Reality Question); “Where was the marble 
in the beginning?” (Memory Question). 
The causality test consisted of 6 of the 12 animations used 
in Experiment 1. In particular, we focused our attention on 
the crucial animations for investigating the relationship 
between physical contact and temporal contiguity (see 
Tables 4 and 5). The experimental procedure was slightly 
different from the procedure used in Experiment 1. 
Participants were told that they were going to see characters 
when presented with animations with eyes, and they were 
told that they were going to see objects when presented with 
animations without eyes. This procedure was meant to 
detect situations in which, while knowing that animations 
involved agents, children still attribute physical causality. 
Each of the 6 animations was presented twice, but not on 
consecutive trials, for a total of 12 animations (12 trials). 
Also, each trial involving an animation with agents required 
the participant to answer two questions, and for this reason 
the animation was presented twice within a trial. Each 
question and each possible answer was written on a piece of 
paper and read aloud by the experimenter. The first question 
was common to both animations, with and without eyes: 
‘Does one move the other or they move by themselves?”. In 
case of animations without eyes, the answer discriminates 
between physical causality and a chance event. In case of 
animations with eyes, the situation is different. Indeed, it is 
possible for someone to recognize two stimuli as agents and 
to interpret their interaction as physical causality, as when 
one person unwillingly pushes the other. Thus, in case of 
agents, the first question was followed by a second one: 
‘Does the [COLOR OF BALL ON THE SCENE SINCE THE 
BEGINNING] ball move  because the [COLOR OF THE BALL 
ENTERING THE SCENE AFTERWARDS] ball want it?’. 
Depending on the answers to the two questions, we coded 
participants’ interpretations of the animation involving 
agents as follows: 
• Character/one moves the other/did not want: 
physical causality 
• Character/one moves the other/wanted: 
communicative psychological causality 
• Character/they move by themselves: private 
psychological causality 
 
Results and Discussion  
In the false belief task the participants behaved according to 
the literature in that autistic children performed poorly  (see, 
e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Leslie & Frith, 1988). Only 
4 of the 16 autistic children answered correctly both the 
Reality and the Memory questions, and of these 4 children 
only 1 answered correctly the Belief question. As regards 
the control group, 7 of the 16 children answered correctly 
both the Reality and the Memory questions, and of these 7 
children 6 answered correctly the Belief question. Hence, 
children in the control group outperformed children in the 
experimental group (Mann-Whitney test: z=2.21, p<.04). As 
regards the causality test, Table 4 and 5 summarize the 
percentages of typologies of judgment by the autistic and 
the control group, respectively.  
 
Table 4. Percentages of typologies of judgment in the 
autistic group of Experiment 2 (kinds of judgment 
statistically more frequent than expected by chance in bold). 
 
     Judgment by autistics 
 
Prob
N° 
Eyes Eye 
contact 
Temp. 
cont. 
Phys. 
cont. 
Chance 
 Phys. 
Causal. 
Priv.  
Psych.
Com. 
Psych.
1 + - + + / 9 19 72 
2 + - - - / 22 6 72 
3 + + + + / 6 13 81 
4 + + - - / 16 16 68 
5 -  + + 59 41 0 0 
6 -  - - 44 56 0 0 
 
A series of bi-nomial tests (with an a priori probability of 
½) reveals what follows for the animations involving 
objects (animations number 5 and 6), the only animations 
having normative correct judgments according to the 
literature. As regards the event in problem 6 (no physical 
contact, no temporal contiguity), the normative correct 
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judgment is chance. As expected, children in the control 
group were more accurate with this problem than children in 
the autistic group (Mann-Whitney test: z= 1.86, tied 
p=<.05). Children in the control group judged the event in 
problem 6 as an instance of chance, whereas  autistic 
children were divided between judgments of physical 
causality and chance, and there was no a difference 
statistically significant between the frequencies in the 
production of the two sorts of judgment (Wilcoxon test: 
z=1, tied p= .25). The event in problem 5 (physical contact 
and temporal contiguity) is prototypic of physical causality; 
the normative correct judgment is physical causality. Again, 
as expected, children in the control group were more 
accurate with this problem than children in the autistic 
group (Mann-Whitney test: z= 3.2, tied p=<.002).  Children 
in the control group judged the event as physical causality. 
Autistic children, instead, divided themselves between 
judgments of chance and physical causality, and there was 
no a difference statistically significant between the 
frequencies in the production of the two typologies of 
judgment (Wilcoxon test: z=.71, tied p= .36).  
 
Table 5. Percentages of typologies of judgment in the 
control group of Experiment 2 (kinds of judgment 
statistically more frequent than expected by chance in bold). 
 
     Judgment by controls 
Prob 
N° 
Eyes Eye 
contact 
Temp. 
cont. 
Phys. 
cont. 
Chance 
 Phys. 
Causal. 
Priv.  
Psych. 
Com. 
Psych.
1 + - + + / 3 53 44 
2 + - - - / 19 9 72 
3 + + + + / 0 47 53 
4 + + - - / 19 6 75 
5 -  + + 6 94 0 0 
6 -  - - 81 19 0 0 
 
As regards the animations involving agents (animations 
with eyes, i.e., number 1 to 4), a series of bi-nomial test 
(with an a priori probability of ¼ for judgments of physical 
causality and private psychological causality, and an a 
priori probability of ½ for judgments of communicative 
psychological causality) reveals what follows. Autistic 
children interpreted all the animations as instances of 
communicative psychological causality, whereas children in 
the control group did not. This result is new in the literature; 
it implies that autistic children, as compared to children in 
the control group, overrated causal interactions as 
communicative. In particular, this result holds for ‘pure’ 
autistic children, as well as for children with a pervasive 
disease of the development non otherwise specified, and 
children with Asperger syndrome (a mean of 2.9 and 2.8 
judgments of communicative psychological causality, 
respectively). Children in the control group were sensitive 
to the interrelations of the variables temporal contiguity and 
physical contact. Only in absence of physical contact and 
temporal contiguity (see problems 2 and 4), children in the 
control group judged the event as an instance of 
communicative psychological causality. On the contrary, in 
case of physical contact and temporal contiguity (see 
problems 1 and 3), they judged the event as an instance of 
private psychological causality. These results reveal a 
pattern which is contrary with respect to that revealed by 
adults’ results in Experiment 1. We have some tentative 
explanations (see the General Discussion). 
The global results of the experiment confirmed the 
predictions deriving from our assumptions. First, differences 
in performance between the autistic children and the non 
autistic children were traceable in both causal domains. 
Most important, the autistic population was poor in physical 
causality understanding. Second, in the case of agents, with 
physical contact and temporal contiguity autistic children 
envisaged communicative intentions more than children in 
the control group did.  
 
General Discussion 
In our investigation we looked for possible factors that 
might interact in producing causality judgments in the 
physical and in the psychological domains. The focus of our 
investigation were launching events. The results of 
Experiment 1 confirmed our predictions: some features of 
the perceptual stimulus influence judgments of causality in 
both the physical and the psychological domain. In 
particular, physical contact and absence of temporal 
contiguity are essential to distinguish between chance 
events and physical causality among objects, and between 
private psychological causality and communicative 
psychological causality among agents. These results are not 
easily reconcilable with those of Woodward, Phillips and 
Spelke (1993). Their children had not specific expectation 
of contact with human agents. More in general, the authors 
purported that infants may have a separate set of principles 
to guide their reasoning about human action. In our view, it 
is possible that previous studies like the one by the authors 
failed to find similarities between judgments of physical and 
psychological causality because they focused on the role of 
single variables rather than on their interactions in 
producing causality judgments in the two domains.  
Also the results of Experiment 2 confirmed our 
expectations: in the physical domain autistic children were 
poorer than controls in understanding physical causality. 
More in general, differences in performance between the 
autistic and the normal children were traceable in both 
causal domains.  
The results of our experiments, along with those in the 
literature, let us envisage several ways to further investigate 
into causality understanding. First, both experiments suggest 
that the interrelation between physical contact and temporal 
contiguity is relevant to understanding causality in both the 
physical and the psychological domain. Nevertheless, in 
Experiment 1 the presence of physical contact and temporal 
contiguity lead to judgments of communicative 
psychological causality, whereas in Experiment 2 judgments 
of communicative psychological causality were produced in 
absence of those two variables. There are at least two 
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possible explanations. One is the difference in the 
experimental procedures used in the two experiments, the 
other is the different age of the participants in the two 
experiments. A replication of Experiment 2 on subjects 
older than 7 years could discriminate between the two 
possibilities. Second, since the participants in our 
experiments had to provide simple Yes/No answers to 
questions about whether agents/objects were involved in the 
animations, and whether they moved 
dependently/independently, future studies should investigate 
how subjects spontaneously interpret similar situations. 
Finally, although in Experiment 2 neither autistics nor 
controls were affected by the variable eye contact, autistics 
seem to have noticed the presence of the eyes in the 
animations and to have taken this kind of stimuli as a cue of 
a communicative interaction. This results contrast with 
those in the literature (see, e.g.,  Klin, 2000; Klin & 
Volkmar, 1995, 1997). A possible explanation relies in the 
experimental material we used;  we used simplified stimuli 
characterized by oversized eyes, but lacking other elements 
that constitute the human face: the nose, the mouth, the ears, 
etc. Also, such simplified stimuli are presented in dyadic, 
rather than complex, social interactions. Our simplified 
stimuli might have resulted in a more salient presence of the 
eyes for autistic children. It would be interesting to verify 
whether a specific training using such a stimuli could 
improve autistics’ sensitivity to psychological 
interpretations in more complex and realistic 
communicative situations. 
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